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INTEREST OF AMICUS
Valley Mental Health, Inc., ("Valley") is a nonprofit
corporation charged with the responsibility of providing mental
health services to clients in Salt Lake and Summit Counties.

It

provides child and adolescent outpatient and acute and intensive
care through thirty treatment and ten residential units.

In 1989,

Valley Mental Health provided services to more than 50,000 clients.
By contract with Salt Lake County, Valley Mental Health provides thei
statutorily mandated mental health services required in Salt Lake
County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-89.
The mission of Valley Mental Health is to improve, enhance,
and promote the emotional well-being of individuals in Salt Lake and
Summit Counties who experience life-disrupting problems due to
mental illness and to strengthen the quality of their personal,
family, and community life. Were this Court to hold that an entity,
like Valley Mental Health, which provides mental health services to
clients, is liable to unidentified victims of the violent acts of
its clients it would substantially impair the ability of Valley
Mental Health to realize its mission by increasing the likelihood
that preventive detentions will occur at the expense of clinically
based therapeutic client care.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ADDRESSED BY AMICUS CURIAE
Valley Mental Health seek's this Court's affirmance of the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake County, Salt
RINCE, YEATES
i QELDZAHLER
Centre I, Suite 900
East Fourth South
Salt Lake City

Lake County Mental Health, Dr. William Kuentzel, Sheryl Steadman,
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The University of Utah and the University of Utah Medical Center
(the "Salt Lake County and University defendants")•

The issue which

Valley will address as amicus curiae is whether the appellees, all
mental health providers, owed a duty to take precautions to protect
Shaundra Higgins, an unidentified victim, from the violent acts of
Carolyn Trujillo.
This issue, which concerns the existence and scope of a
legal duty, is a matter of law which may be examined independently
by this Court without deference to findings or conclusions entered
below.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Valley believes that the interpretation of the following
statutes substantially bears on the existence and scope of mental
health care providers to protect unidentified third parties from the
violent acts of mental patients.

The complete text of these

statutes is set out in the addendum to this brief:
Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-89
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-101, et seq.
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-1, et seq.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-21
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-34
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-36
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1)
:E, YEATES
LDZAHLER
ire I, Suite 900
Fourth South

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11
-3-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of a summary judgment entered by Third
District Court Judge James Sawaya in favor of the appellees on the
grounds that as mental health providers, the appellees owed no duty
to protect Shaundra Higgins or her mother from Carolyn Trujillo, a
mentally ill person who was receiving treatment as a voluntary
patient from Salt Lake County Mental Health and who stabbed Shaundra
Higgins.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following are facts which Valley believes to be
relevant to the issue of duty addressed by it as amicus. Valley
contends that neither the Salt Lake County nor University defendants
owed a duty to Shaundra Higgins or her mother.

For the purpose of

assessing whether this duty existed, Valley assumes that each of the
appellees treated the assailant, Carolyn Trujillo, in a manner
inconsistent with the appropriate standard of care.

Accordingly,

Valley's Statement of Facts will not address the quality of care
given Ms. Trujillo.
Because this case was decided on summary judgment, those
facts which are relevant to the issue of the appellees' legal duty
are considered in the light most favorable to Shaundra and Kathy
Lynn Higgins.

(Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d

864, 866 (Utah 1988) .)
1.
RINCE, YEATES
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On February 25, 1984, Salt Lake County Mental Health

admitted Carolyn Trujillo to its Adult Residential Treatment Unit
-4-

("ARTU").

ARTU was a group home providing a structured residential

environment supervised by an on-site staff which administered
medications and conducted behavior modification and group programs
for patients.
2.

(R. 2375, Depo. Whittaker, pp. 10-12.)
In mid-March 1984, Ms. Trujillo was discharged from

ARTU and returned home.

She agreed to attend Tuesday and Thursday

evening therapy through ARTU's "evening-weekend" program.

(Depo.

Romero, Vol. II P. 48, Romero Vol. 1, pp. 80, 83, 87.)
3.

Despite its structured setting, ARTU was less

restrictive and did not compromise the civil liberties of patients
to the degree typically experienced as an inpatient in a hospital.
(R. 2373, Depo. Whittaker, pp. 84-85; R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p.
79; R. 2376, Depo. Ely, p. 89).
4.

Carolyn Trujillo*attacked and stabbed Shaundra Higgin$

on April 10, 1984. At the time of the stabbing, Ms. Trujillo was a
voluntary patient of Salt Lake County Mental Health.

(R. 2371,

Depo. Steadman, pp. 177-182.)
5.

Prior to the attack Carolyn Trujillo did not manifest

to the Salt Lake County or University defendants, or to its
therapists, any threat of violence against Shaundra Higgins.
According to her written statement describing the attack, Carolyn
Trujillo was stimulated to attack Shaundra Higgins by "voices" which
she heard immediately before the attack and which instructed her to
"hurt someone."

-5-

6.

Carolyn Trujillo was found guilty and mentally ill to

attempted criminal homicide, manslaughter, a third-degree felony,
and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 0-5 years.

(R. 1233,

Exhibit 1.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Consistent with traditional principles of common law, Utah
does not require that a person control the conduct of another or
warn potential victims of his acts.
1187 (Utah 1989).

Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d

The "special relationship" exception to this

principle is limited to situations in which a defendant has a "legal
right to control" the acts of the third party.
None of the appellees had the legal right to control the
conduct of Carolyn Trujillo and therefore owed no duty to Shaundra
Higgins.
Utah statutes governing the admission and discharge of
patients to mental health facilities underscore the limited scope ofl
a mental health professional's duty to the victims of the violent
acts of patients.

The enactment in 1988 of Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-14a-101, et seq. codified Utah's common law and public policy
by recognizing that therapists have no duty to take precautions to
protect unidentified potential victims of patients and by limiting
the therapist's duty to that of the duty to warn potential victims
who have been reasonably identified in threats of physical violence
made by patients.

-6-

This scope of duty of consistent with the Legislature's
concern that the liberty interests and right to treatment of the
mentally ill be compromised only in the face of compelling evidence
of immediate dangerousness when the result would be preventative
detention.
In addition to the statutory constraints, clinical
considerations, particularly the unsparing commitment to treatment
and well-recognized difficulties in making accurate predictions of
long-term future dangerousness, properly motivate therapists to be
wary of exercising "control" over patients. Were the expansive duty
urged by the appellants to hold sway, the result would be an
inevitable increase in nontherapeutic confinements of the mentally
ill, an outcome directly at odds with the Constitution, law, and
public policy of this state.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE EXISTENCE AND SCOPE OF A MENTAL HEALTH CARE PROVIDER'S
DUTY TO THE UNIDENTIFIED POTENTIAL VICTIMS OF THE VIOLENT ACTS
OF PATIENTS IS A LEGAL ISSUE SUBJECT TO THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS
AND DECISION FREE OF FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE
QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE PROVIDED THE ASSAILANT.
The dispositive issue in this appeal, and the issue most

charged with potential clinical repercussions for Valley, is whether
the University or Salt Lake County defendants owed a legal duty to
Shaundra and Mary Lynn Higgins. Whether this duty existed is
"entirely a question of law to be determined by the court."

Ferree

v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989), citing Weber v. Springvillf
E, YEATES
DZAHLER
re I, Suite 900
Fourth South
_ake City

City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986).
-7-

Of course, this Court's analysis of the existence and
scope of the alleged duty may draw on many sources in aid of
reaching a principled decision, including precedential authorities
and social policy.

(See, Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.Supp. 1333

(D.Colo. 1983), citing Prosser, Law of Torts § 43, 257 (4th ed.
1971), with approval for proposition that the question of whether a
legal duty should be imposed necessarily involves social policy
considerations.)

The central focus of any duty analysis bears on

the characteristics of the relationship among the parties.

In this

case the two critical facts that define relationships are
unambiguous and uncontroverted.

Carolyn Trujillo was a voluntary

patient, and she made no threat of harm against anyone.

The

University of Utah Hospital emergency room treated Ms. Trujillo as
a voluntary patient on February 25, 1984. Salt Lake County Mental
Health provided voluntary treatment to Ms. Trujillo through
programs offered by its ARTU unit.

Ms. Trujillo attacked Ms.

Higgins at the direction of "voices" which she heard immediately
before the assault, which took place more than three weeks after
her discharge from ARTU.
The appellants devote nineteen pages of their brief (pages
7-26) to a recitation of "facts" relating to Ms. Trujillo's history
of mental illness and alleged substandard care provided by the
University and Salt Lake County defendants.

RINCE, YEATES
V QELDZAHLER
'Centre I, Suite 900
East Fourth South
Salt Lake City
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Neither these "facts"

nor the arguments built around them relate to the existence or
scope of duty that might have been owed by the University and Salt
Lake County defendants to the Higgenses.

Opinion testimony

challenging as insufficient the degree of "control" exercised by
the University and Salt Lake County defendants and offering up the
opinion that these defendants should have established a closer or
more "special" relationship with Ms. Trujillo should not deflect
this Court from considering the issue of duty based on the
relationships among the parties as they actually existed.
2.

THE CONTOURS OF THE DUTY TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST THE HARM
CAUSED BY THE ACTS OF THIRD PERSONS AS FASHIONED BY THIS
COURT IN SETTINGS OTHER THAN THOSE INVOLVING MENTALLY ILL
PERSONS DO NOT ENCOMPASS THESE FACTS.
Utah law conforms to the traditional common law principle

that places a defendant under no duty to take precautions to avoid
harm when to do so would require exercising control over the
conduct of another or warning others of their peril.

Our law has

adopted, however, the two exceptions to this rule recognized in
Section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which arise if:
(a) a special relation exists between the [defendant] and
the third person which imposes a duty upon the [defendant] to
control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the [defendant] and
the other which gives to the other a right to protection from the
third person.

-9-

Hale v, Allstate Ins, Co., 639 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1981) (Quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1964)).
This Court has analyzed the scope of the "special
relation" exception in the contexts where peace officers who
stopped but did not arrest an intoxicated motorcyclist prior to a
fatal accident (Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984);
where corrections officers who authorized weekend release for a
resident of a halfway house who bludgeoned his victim to death
(Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989); and where Division of
Family Services officials who had received accusations of abuse
against babysitter who severely battered a child (Owens v.
Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989)).

In each instance, this Court

held that no duty was owed the plaintiff to control or warn.

Two

of these decisions, Owens and Ferree, affirmed summary judgments.
No Utah appellate decision has confronted the issue of
third-party duty in a mental health setting.

Each of the cases

cited above, however, contributes compellingly to the conclusion
that no duty was owed by the University and Salt Lake County
defendants to Ms. Higgins.

In Christenson, the Court declined to

impose a duty of due care toward the decedent, an intoxicated
motorist.

The sheriff's deputies who encountered the decedent

clearly had the right to exercise control over him had they so
desired.

Certainly, in an era in which drunk driving has become

-10-

particularly opprobrious, the deputies were under no obligation to
be sensitive to the deceased's liberty interests.

This situation

is markedly different from that of the mental health worker whose
inclinations to restrain, detain, and confine must, as the
discussion below develops, be constantly weighed against the
liberty interests of his patient.
Owens is instructive for its determination that no duty
was owed to the unidentified potential victim of the babysitter's
conduct as long as the Division of Family Services had no legal
right to control her.

The University and Salt Lake County

defendants likewise had no legal right to control Ms. Trujillo.
The Owens plaintiffs also sought unsuccessfully to invoke state and
federal child abuse prevention statutes, claiming that they created
independent statutory duties and that they lent support to their
common law duty assertions.

Although the state Child Abuse

Prevention Act clearly mandated aggressive DFS response to
allegations of abuse in an effort to protect children generally,
the Court found that no relationship giving rise to a cognizable
duty under the statute arose unless a specific victim is
identified.-

As discussed below, at the time of this incident,

i/ Justice Zimmerman wrote separately to distance himself from
the majority opinion's apparent holding that statute would support
the creation of a legal duty when a specific victim is
identified. 784 P.2d 1187, 1193.
-, YEATES
DZAHLER
e l , Suite 900
Fourth South
.ake City

-11-

Utah had adopted an expansive body of law dealing with the
voluntary and involuntary treatment of mentally ill persons. See
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-1, et seq.

These statutes, unlike the Child

Abuse Prevention Act, did not have as their primary purpose the
protection of unidentified victims of the acts of mentally ill
persons.
In dictum, the Owens court suggested that because the
statute was enacted for the purpose of protecting children, DFS may
owe a duty to children who are identified as needing protection.
The statute does not, however, concern itself with the liberty
interests of the perpetrators of abuse.

Once the potential victim

is identified, DFS may be expected to secure legal control over the
perpetrator with reasonable zeal.

By contrast, even if the mental

health statutes were enacted for the purpose of protecting the
victims of the acts of mentally ill persons, the explicit statutory
safeguards of the liberties of the mentally ill render the duty
even more tenuous here than in the child abuse setting.
The Ferree court addressed a situation in which legal
control was present—the assailant was a halfway house resident in
the custody of the Department of Corrections—but nevertheless held
that no duty existed because the defendant did not know the
identity of the assailant's victim.

As in both Christenson and

Owens, no concern for treatment or liberty interests was present to
mitigate the right or ability to exercise control.

-12-

In sum, the relevant Supreme Court authority supports the
trial court's finding that the University and Salt Lake County
defendants owed no duty to Ms. Trujillo's unidentified victim.
3.

SOCIAL POLICY AND CLINICAL CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING THE
OBJECTIVE OF PROVIDING TREATMENT TO MENTALLY ILL PERSONS IN
THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE SETTING POSSIBLE, THE IMPRECISION WITH
WHICH DANGEROUSNESS MAY BE PREDICTED, AND THE AVOIDANCE OF
UNNECESSARY PREVENTIVE DETENTION COMPEL THE REJECTION OF THE
DUTY SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFFS.
A thorough assessment of the social and clinical policy

considerations is relevant, even critical, to the analysis of the
propriety of imposing a duty to control mentally ill persons who
have made no threat against an identifiable victim.

The

traditional common law limitations on a person's duty should not
give way to the "special relation" exception and the resulting
expansion of affirmative duties without "a careful consideration
of the consequences for the parties and society at large."

Beach

v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986).
The Beach court further justified its wariness of the
"special relation" exception with an observation of particular
relevance to this case.

The Court stated:

"If the duty is

realistically incapable of performance, or if it is fundamentally
at odds with the nature of the parties' relationship, we should be
loath to term that relationship 'special' and to impose a
resulting duty, . . ."

Id.

That exercise of "control" over a

mentally ill person may be in fundamental conflict with the

;E, YEATES
LDZAHLER
tre I, Suite 900
t Fourth South
i auA ritu
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objectives of the psychotherapist-patient relationship is a
concept that lies at the heart of the duty analysis in this case
and is an issue which finds expression in judicial opinions,
psychiatric literature, and Utah statutes.

Illustrative of the

majority view rejecting the "special relation" duty in a voluntary
treatment setting is this commentary on the
psychotherapist-patient "control" dilemma:
The typical relationship between a psychiatrist
and a voluntary outpatient would seem to lack
sufficient elements of control necessary to bring
such relationship within the rule of Section
315. Indeed, lack of control by the therapist
and maximum freedom for the patient is oft times
the end sought by both the psychiatric profession
and the law.
Hasenei v. United States, 541 F.Supp. 999, 1009 (D.Md. 1982).
Recent articles in the psychiatric literature have
addressed the increased control and compromised freedom that has
accompanied the application of the "special relation" duty exception to psychotherapists since Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal 1976).
Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D., likely the most respected commentator on
the issues surrounding the duty to protect, has noted that "concern about potential liability is leading some clinicians to
participate in the creation of a system of preventive detention
for persons thought likely to commit violent acts."
PS:

"The New Preventive Detention:

-14-

Appelbaum

Psychiatry's Problematic

Responsibility for the Control of Violence."

Am J Psychiatry

1988; 145:779-785. Although nontherapeutic preventive detention
may reduce the risk of liability and offer society an added
measure of safety, Dr. Appelbaum presents a "negative side of the
ledger . . . crowded with more easily demonstrable factors."
783.

Id.,

The darker side of preventive detention includes hospitali-

zations of persons unlikely to benefit from inpatient treatment,
misallocation of scarce resources, disruption of treatment
programs, and impairment of staff morale and competence.
Empirical support for the conclusion that nontherapeutic
hospitalizations are commonplace appears in a study comparing the
frequency of civil commitments jurisdictions using a dangerousness-oriented commitment standard with those which have enacted
commitment criteria which abandon the dangerousness element. The
findings revealed that significantly more patients were committed
under the dangerousness criteria, a result attributed to
tendencies to overpredict dangerousness, i.e., to hospitalize
patients who are not dangerous.

Hoge SK, et al:

"Limitations on

Psychiatrists' Discretionary Civil Commitment Authority by the
Stone and Dangerousness Criteria"; Arch Gen Psychiatry
1988;45:764-769.
The long recognized imprecision in predicting a mental
patient's "dangerousness" compounds the likelihood of preventative
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detention and magnifies its invidious social and constitutional
consequences.
The results of research published over the last two
decades support the conclusion that little headway has been
achieved in the quest to predict dangerousness.

The most recent

psychiatric literature continues to suggest that even attempts to
predict immediate dangerousness are largely exercises in
2/
speculation.—

— S e e American Psychiatric Association Task Force Report,
Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual 28 (1974) (90% error
rate "unfortunately . ". ". is the state of the art"); Steadman,
Predicting Dangerousness Among the Mentally 111, 6 Int'1. J. L. &
Psychiatry 381-90 (1983). See generally Wettstein, The Prediction
of Violent Behavior And The Duty To Protect Third Parties, 2 Beh.
Sci. L. 291 (1984); Scott, Violence in Prisoners and Patients,
Medical Care of Prisoners and Detainees, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439
(1975); Rector, Who Are the Dangerous? Bull. Am. Acad. Psych. & L.
186 (July 1973); Justice & Birkman, An Effort to Distinguish the
Violent from the Nonviolent, 65 S. Med. J. 703 (1972); Kozol,
Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness,
18 Crime & Delinquency 371 (1972); Rubin, Prediction of
Dangerousness in Mentally 111 Criminals, 27 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry
397 (1972); Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a
Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 Am. J. Psychiatry 10,
11 (1984); Monahan, Social Policy Implications of the Inability to
Predict Violence, 31 J. Soc. Issues, 153, 157 (1975); Kirk, Allen,
MD: The Prediction of Violent Behavior During Short-Term Civil
Commitment, Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1989);
Cocozza, J, Steadman, H., The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions
of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, Rutgers L. Rev.
27:1084-1101 (1976).
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Clearly, the reliability of any dangerousness prediction
diminishes substantially as the forecast moves beyond the
immediate to a more remote future.

The daunting obstacles to

making a "scientific" prediction of dangerousness beyond the
immediate future have a direct bearing on the imposition of a duty
on a psycho-therapist to make such a forecast.

As a practical

matter, if a duty were found to exist, the difficulties inherent
in making a prediction of long term dangerousness would likely be
overshadowed by the retrospective bias which would be the
inevitable product of a patient's violent conduct.

Knowing that

the lens of hindsight is far clearer than that available to the
forecaster, even the most liberty conscious psychotherapist may
succumb to the temptation to impose preventive detention.
Utah's statutory sensitivity to the liberty interests and
need for treatment of the mentally ill reflects legislative
rejection of preventive detention and a common law duty to
control.

The common law of duties owed by psychotherapists to

third parties cannot be evaluated without considering the
implications of Utah's comprehensive mental health statutes, Utah
Code Ann. § 64-7-1, et seq.

Principles of common law must yield

when in conflict with the Constitution and laws of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1.

Utah's mental health statutes regulate

and restrict the authority of psychotherapists, institutions, and
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the public to treat and restrain mentally ill persons. While
these statutes may not be in irreconcilible conflict with the
common law, they define its bounds and inform its substance.
Constraints on the control of the mentally ill appear
throughout Utah law.

A person who attempts to improperly civilly

commit a person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor and is liable
for damages, Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-21.

Nontherapeutic detention

of a mentally ill person is authorized only in emergency temporary
commitment situations.

A mental health officer or peace officer

may take a person into protective custody only upon a showing of
probable cause that there is a "substantial likelihood of serious
harm to that person or others." After apprehension, a mentally
ill person may be held on nontherapeutic emergency detention for
up to twenty-four hours, but ohly upon a showing of "substantial
and immediate danger to himself or others."
§ 64-7-34.

Utah Code Ann.

A person suffering from a mental illness may be

involuntarily committed only after a demonstration, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the patient "poses an immediate danger
of physical injury to others or himself," that "there is no appropriate less-restrictive alternative to a court order of commitment," and that treatment is available to meet the patient's
needs.

RINCE, YEATES
i QELDZAHLER
Centre I, Suite 900
East Fourth South
Salt Lake City

Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-36.
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The mandate that a mentally ill person's liberty
interests be safeguarded to the greatest degree possible is a
strident theme throughout Utah's mental health law.

The

subjection of the patient to "control" is mandated, as the
sections cited above indicate, only after rigorous criteria have
been satisfied.
When viewed against this statutory backdrop, the social
and clinical failings of an expansive duty to protect become
evident.

Such a duty may well benefit society by preventing an

occasional violent act.

This benefit, however laudable, does not

justify the inevitable retreat from the clear purposes of Utah's
mental health laws.

In the final analysis, the plaintiff's notion

of common law duty directly conflicts with Utah law and must yield
to it.
Just as the body of mental health law which was enacted
at the time of Ms. Trujillo's assault is an essential analytical
tool in determining the existence and scope of the duty to protect, of equal significance was the Legislature's subsequent enactment, in 1988, of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-101 creating a duty
to warn identifiable potential victims of physical harm.

While

the statute is not subject to retroactive application to this
case, it represents codification of the common law of 1984. As
argued above, this Court's holdings outside the mental health

IE, YEATES
LDZAHLER
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setting, together with social and clinical considerations, and the
language and purpose of Utah's mental health statutes, combine to
discredit any duty to control patients as a precaution against
harm to unidentified potential victims.

The 1988 statute is

consistent with this view.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l) begins with the
unambiguous declaration that a therapist "has no duty to warn or
take precautions . . . . " —3/
This general disclaimer of duty
accurately defines the state of the common law, particularly when
no potential target of violence in need of warning or precautions
has been identified.

See, Owens v. Garfield and Ferree v. State,

supra.
The Legislature created the sole exception to this
general rejection of duty in the next clause of § 78-14a-102(l).
By fashioning a duty to warn on therapists who receive threats
directed at reasonably identifiable victims, the Legislature
codified what, by dictum in Ferree, supra, the Supreme Court
indicated may comprise a common law duty.

The scope of the duty

1/
The appellants attempt to render the section inapplicable by
asserting, in footnote 14 at page 40 of their brief, that the
University and Salt lake County defendants are "institutions," not
"therapists" and therefore outside the scope of the act. This
argument is a practical cipher. An institution which employs no
therapists will have no clients or patients who might communicate
threats requiring warning and hence cannot encounter liability for
violating the act. Institutions which employ therapists will be
subject to the act under theories of vicarious liability.
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defined in § 78-14a-102(1) is clearly communicated by its
language.

The appellants contend, based on their reading of the

legislative history of the section, that a therapist who breaches
professional standards retains a duty to warn and protect, the
statute notwithstanding.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11,

the words and phrases used in statutes are to be "construed
according to the context and the approved usage of the language."
The word "no" has but one approved usage in the English language.
"No" loses none of its clarity when used in § 78-14a-102(1) in the
context "no duty to warn or take precautions."

Unambiguous

statutory language may not be contradicted by legislative
history.

Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806

(Utah 1988).
In short, neither the 1988 statute nor the common law
which it codified recognized the notion of duty urged by the
appellants, but instead each kept faith with the social and
clinical imperatives that would make the imposition of the
appellants' duty unwise policy and bad law.
4.

BRADY V. HOPPER PRESENTS A WELL-REASONED CONSIDERATION OF
THE CLINICAL AND LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE DUTY TO PROTECT AND
SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THIS COURT.
Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.Supp. 1333 (D.Colo. 1983), aff'd,

75a F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984), is, among the welter of opinions
published since Tarasoff, supra, the "best" case on the duty of a

:E, YEATES
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psychotherapist to warn or control.

It owes this status to its

factual similarity to this case, to the quality of its
reasoning—reasoning that is cast in a tone that bespeaks a trial
judge going toe to toe with a tough issue.

In Brady, the mental

patient was John Hinkley, who shot the plaintiff, James Brady, in
the course of Mr. Hinkley's assassination attempt on President
Ronald Reagan.

Mr. Brady claimed that Mr. Hinkley's outpatient

psychiatrist, Dr. Hopper, owed him a duty to protect him from Mr.
Hinkley's violent acts.

Mr. Brady alleged that Dr. Hopper

declined to hospitalize Mr. Hinkley over the objection of Mr.
Hinkley's parents—affirmation of court in Hasenei v. United
States, supra, that lack of control by the therapist and maximum
freedom for the patient is often the objective of psychiatry. Mr.
Hinkley never communicated to Dr. Hopper a threat against Mr.
Brady or Mr. Reagan.

Mr. Brady's complaint alleged that despite

the absence of threats, Dr. Hopper should have discovered that Mr.
Hinkley was armed, that he identified with the assassin in the
movie "Taxi Driver," and that he was assembling books and articles
on political assassinations.

According to Mr. Brady's

allegations, if Dr. Hopper had acquired knowledge of Mr. Hinkley's
activities, he would have controlled Mr. Hinkley's behavior and
avoided the assassination attempt.

INCE, YEATES
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The case came before the trial judge on Dr. Hopper's
motion to dismiss, grounded on a claim that he owed no duty to Mr.
Brady.

The court recast the "special relationship11 analysis by

asking "to what extent was Dr. Hopper obligated to protect these
particular plaintiffs from this particular harm?"

Id., 1338. The

court was unwilling to obligate Dr. Hopper to protect the world at
large.

It narrowed the scope of Dr. Hopper's duty by applying the

traditional foreseeability test announced by Justice Cardozo in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
The court reasoned that in this context, foreseeability was
limited to the subjects of specific threats communicated by Mr.
Hinkley.

Because there were no allegations that Mr. Hinkley

threatened President Reagan or Mr. Brady, there was no legal
relationship between Dr. Hopper and Mr. Brady and, consequently,
no duty or attendant liability.
The same analysis is applicable to this case.

The Brady

court summarized its reasoning in a paragraph that merits, as an
apt summary of Valley's arguments, quotation in full:
The question of whether a legal duty should
be imposed necessarily involves social policy
considerations. (citation omitted) In the
present case, there are cogent policy reasons for
limiting the scope of the therapist's liability.
To impose upon those in the counseling
professions an ill-defined "duty to control"
would require therapists to be ultimately
responsible for the actions of their patients.
Such a rule would closely approximate a strict
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liability standard of care, and therapists would
be potentially lia ble for all harm inflicted by
persons presently or formerly under psychiatric
treatment. Human behavior is simply too
unpredictable, and the field of psychotherapy
presently too inex act, to so greatly expand the
scope of therapist s1 liability. In my opinion,
the "specific thre ats to specific victims" rule
states a workable, reasonable, and fair boundary
upon the sphere of a therapist's liability to
third persons for the acts of their patients.
Id,

1339.

CONCLUSION
Common law, social policy, clinical practices, and the
unpredictability of human behavior all coalesce around the
conclusion that the University and Salt Lake County defendants
owed no duty to the Higgins.

The trial court's judgment should

therefore be affirmed.
DATED this

/ ~~ day of March, 1991.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

ycgSjUt&4i
Ronald E. Nehring
Attorneys for VallejLMental Health
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17-5-89. Mental health and substance abuse services.
The board of county commissioners of each county shall provide mental
health services in accordance with Chapter 12, Title 62A, and substance
abuse services in accordance with Chapter 8, Title 62A.
History: C. 1953, 17-5-89, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 181, § 1.

68

Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch 181,
§ 30 makes the act effective on July 1, 1990.

64-7-1. Successor to state insane asylum.
The state insane asylum now established and located at Provo in the county
of Utah, shall be known as the Utah State Hospital.
Historv: R.S. 1898. § 2153; L. 1903, ch.
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2153; C.L. 1917, § 5383;
L. 1927, ch. 36, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
85-7-1.
Cross-References. —- Establishment and
support of institution, Utah Const., Art. XIX,
Sec. 2.
Guardians
of incapacitated
persons,
§§ 75-5-101 to 75-5-105, 75-5-301 et seq.
Inquiry into defendant's insanity, Chapter
15 of Title 77.

Land grants, Enabling Act, § 12; Utah
Const., Art. XX. Sec. 1.
Location of institution, Utah Const., Art.
XIX, Sec. 3.
Poor persons, order in which relatives liable
for support, § 17-14-2.
Sale of products, disposition of proceeds,
§ 64-1-9.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The "Mentally 111"
and the Law: Sisyphus and Zeus, James E.
Beaver, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 1.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 40 Am. Jur. 2d Hospitals
and Asylums § 1 et Beq.

C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Asylums and Institutional
Care Facilities §§ 3, 4; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 4.
Key Numbers. — Asylums «=> 2; Hospitals
«=> 2.

64-7-21. Unlawful introduction into mental health facility
— Criminal and civil liability.
Any person who attempts to introduce another into a mental health facility
contrary to the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
besides being liable in an action for damages or subject to other criminal
charges.
History: R.S. 1898, § 2194; L. 1903, ch.
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2194; C.L. 1917, § 5424;
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,85-7-46; L. 1975, ch. 198,
§ 11.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent
Persons § 37.
A.L.R. — Libel and slander: actionability of
imputing to private person mental disorder or
incapacity, or impairment of mental facilities,
23 A.L.R.3d 652.
Liability for malicious prosecution predi-

cated upon institution of, or conduct in connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 A.L.R.3d
455.
Liability for false imprisonment predicated
on institution of, or conduct in connection with,
insanity proceedings, 30 A.L.R.3d 523.

64-7-34. Temporary admission to mental health facility —
Requirements and procedures — Costs.
(1) Any individual may temporarily be admitted to a mental health facility
upon:
(a) written application by a responsible person who has reason to know,
stating a belief that the individual is likely to cause serious injury to self
or others if not immediately restrained, and the personal knowledge of
the individual's condition or circumstances which lead to such belief, and
(b) a certification by a licensed physician or designated examiner stating that the physician or designated examiner has examined the individual within a three-day period immediately preceding said certification
and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and, because of the
individual's mental illness, is likely to injure self or others if not immediately restrained.
Such an application and certificate shall authorize any mental health or
peace officer to take the individual into custody and transport the individual
to a mental health facility.
(2) If a duly authorized mental health officer or peace officer observes a
person involved in conduct which leads the officer to have probable cause to
believe that such person is mentally ill, as defined by this act, and that,
because of such apparent mental illness and conduct, there is a substantial
likelihood of serious harm to that person or to others pending proceedings for
examination and certification as provided in this act, the officer may take the
person into protective custody. A peace officer may transport a patient pursuant to this provision either on the basis of his own observation or on the basis
of the observation of a mental health officer, reported to him by the mental
health officer. Immediately thereafter, the officer shall transport the person to
a mental health facility and there make application for the person's admission
therein. The application shall be upon a prescribed form and shall include the
following:
(a) a statement by the officer that the officer believes on the basis of
personal observation or on the basis of the observation of a mental health
officer reported to him by the mental health officer that the person is, as a

result of a mental illness, a substantial and immediate danger to self or
others.
(b) the specific nature of the danger.
(c) a summary of the observations upon which the statement of danger
is based.
(d) a statement of facts which called the person to the attention of the
officer.
(3) Any person admitted under this section may be held for a maximum of
24 hours excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. At the expiration
of that time period, the person shall be released unless application for involuntary hospitalization has been commenced pursuant to § 64-7-36. If such
application has been made, an order of detention may be entered pursuant to
Subsection (3) of § 64-7-36. If no order of detention is issued, the patient shall
be released, except when the patient has made voluntary application for admission.
(4) Cost of all diagnosis and treatment under this section shall be paid by
the county in which such person is found, unless the coimty participates in the
state social services medical program as outlined in § 55-15a-3, in which
event the state shall pay, or unless the person is financially able to pay the
same in which event that person shall pay.
History: C. 1943, 85-7-60, enacted by L.
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963,
ch. 159, § 1; 1971, ch. 172, § 8; 1975, ch. 198,
§ 21; 1979, ch. 97, § 15; 1981, ch. 261, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amendment deleted "upon endorsement for such purpose by a judge of the district court or a member of the board of county commissioners of the
county in which the individual is present" after
"certificate" in the second paragraph of Subsection (1); inserted "officer" after "mental
health" in the first sentence of Subsection (2);
inserted the second sentence of Subsection (2);
and inserted "or on the basis of the observation

of a mental health officer reported to him by
the mental health officer" in Subsection (2)(a).
Meaning of 'this act". — The term "this
act," referred to in this section, means Laws
1975, ch. 198, §§ 1 to 34, which appear as various sections throughout Titles 26 and 64. See
Table of Session Laws in Parallel Tables volume.
Compiler's Notes. — Section 55-15a-3,
cited in Subsection (4), is repealed. See
§ 26-18-10.
Cross-References. Limitation of application as to criminally insane, § 64-7-54.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent
Persons §§ 8 to 25, 39 to 42.
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14 to
34.

Key Numbers. — Mental Health «=» 37 to
46.
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dations to the court regarding the order for involuntary hospitalization of the
proposed patient.
History: C. 1953, 64-7-35, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 97, § 16.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1975, ch. 198,
§ 35 repealed former § 64-7-35 (C. 1943,
85-7-61, enacted by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L.

1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1971, ch. 172, § 9), relating
to protective custody pending examination and
certification.
Cross-References. — Admission to practice
law, § 78-51-10.

64-7-36. Involuntary hospitalization on court order — Examination of patient — Hearing — Power of court
— Findings — Costs.
(1) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual may be
commenced by the filing of a written application with the district court of the
county in which the proposed patient resides or is found, by a responsible
person who has reason to know of the condition or circumstances of the proposed patient which lead to the belief that the individual is mentally ill and
should be involuntarily hospitalized. Any such application shall be accompanied by:
(a) a certificate of a licensed physician or a designated examiner stating that within a seven-day period immediately preceding the certification the physician or designated examiner has examined the individual
and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and should be
involuntarily hospitalized; or
(b) a written statement by the applicant that the individual has been
requested to but has refused to submit to an examination of mental condition by a licensed physician or designated examiner. Said application
shall be sworn to under oath and shall state the facts upon which the
application is based.
(2) Prior to issuing a judicial order, the court may require the applicant to
consult a mental health facility or may direct a mental health professional
from a mental health facility to interview the applicant and the proposed
patient to determine the existing facts and report them to the court.
(3) If the court finds from the application, any other statements under oath,
or any reports from a mental^iealth professional that there is a reasonable
basis to believe that the proposed patient's mental condition and immediate
danger to self, others or property requires involuntary hospitalization pending
examination and hearing, or if the proposed patient has refused to submit to
an interview with a mental health professional as directed by the court, or to
go to a treatment facility voluntarily, the court may issue an order directed to
a mental health officer or peace officer to immediately take the proposed
patient to any mental health facility, or a temporary emergency facility as
provided in Section [Subsection] 64-7-38(2), there to be detained for the purpose of examination. Within 24 hours of the issuance of the order for examination, the clinical director of a mental health facility or a designee shall report
to the court orally or in writing whether the patient is, in the opinion of the
examiners, mentally ill, whether the patient has agreed to become a voluntary patient pursuant to § 64-7-29, and whether treatment programs are
available and acceptable without court proceedings. Based on such information, the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceed55
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ings and dismiss the application. In any event, if the examiner reports orally,
the examiner shall immediately send the report in writing to the clerk of the
court.
(4) Notice of the commencement of proceedings for involuntary hospitalization, setting forth the allegations of the application and any reported facts,
together with a copy of any official order of detention, shall be provided by the
court to a proposed patient prior to, or upon, admission to a mental health
facility or, with respect to any individual presently in a mental health facility
whose status is being changed from voluntary to involuntary, upon the filing
of an application for that purpose with the court. A copy of such order of
detention must be maintained at the place of detention.
(5) Notice of the commencement of such proceedings shall be provided by
the court as soon as practicable to the applicant, any legal guardian, any
immediate adult family members, the legal counsel for the parties involved,
and any other persons the proposed patient or the court shall designate, and
shall advise such persons that a hearing thereon may be held within the time
provided by law, unless the patient has refused to permit release of such
information in which case the extent of notice shall be determined by the
court.
(6) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual under
the age of eighteen years who is under the continuing jurisdiction of the
juvenile court may be commenced by the filing of a written application with
the juvenile court in accordance with the provisions of this section and said
court shall have jurisdiction to proceed in such case in the same manner and
with the same authority as the district court.
(7) If there are no appropriate mental health resources within the district,
the court may in its discretion transfer the case or patient's custody to any
other district court within the state of Utah provided that said transfer will
not be adverse to the interest of the proposed patient.
(8) Within twenty-four hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, of the issuance of a judicial order or after admission at a mental health
facility of a proposed patient under court order for detention or examination,
the court shall appoint two designated examiners to examine the proposed
patient. If requested by the proposed patient's counsel, the court shall appoint
as one of the examiners a reasonably available qualified person designated by
counsel. The examinations, to be conducted separately, shall be held at the
home of the proposed patient, a hospital or other medical facility, or at any
other suitable place not likely to have a harmful effect on the patient's health.
A time shall be set for a hearing to be held within ten court days of the
appointment of the designated examiners unless said examiners or the clinical director of the mental health facility shall inform the court prior to said
hearing date that the patient is not mentally ill, that the patient has agreed to
become a voluntary patient pursuant to § 64-7-29, or that treatment programs are available and acceptable without court proceedings in which event
the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceedings
and dismiss the application.
(9) Prior to the hearing, an opportunity to be represented by counsel shall
be afforded to every proposed patient, and if neither the patient nor others
provide counsel, the court shall appoint counsel and allow sufficient time to
consult with the patient prior to the hearing. In the case of an indigent patient, the payment of reasonable attorney's fees for counsel as determined by
56
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the court shall be made by the county in which the patient resides or was
found. The proposed patient, the applicant, and all other persons to whom
notice is required to be given shall be afforded an opportunity to appear at the
hearing, to testify, and to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the court
may in its discretion receive the testimony of any other person. The court may
allow a waiver of the patient's right to appear only for good cause shown,
which cause shall be made a matter of court record. The court is authorized to
exclude all persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings and may,
upon motion of counsel, require the testimony of each examiner to be given
out of the presence of any other examiners. The hearing shall be conducted in
as informal a manner as may be consistent with orderly procedure and in a
physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect on the mental health of the
proposed patient. The court shall receive all relevant and material evidence
which may be offered subject to the rules of evidence.
The mental health facility or the physician in charge of the patient's care
shall provide to the court at the time of the hearing the following information:
the detention order, the admission notes, the diagnosis, any doctors' orders,
the progress notes, the nursing notes and the medication records pertaining to
the current hospitalization. Said information shall also be supplied to the
patient's counsel at the time of the hearing and at any time prior thereto upon
request.
(10) The court shall order hospitalization if, upon completion of the hearing
and consideration of the record, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) The proposed patient has a mental illness; and
(b) Because of the patient's illness the proposed patient poses an immediate danger of physical injury to others or self, which may include the
inability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and
shelter, if allowed to remain at liberty; and
(c) The patient lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision-making process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated by evidence of inability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of
treatment; and
(d) There is no appropriate less restrictive alternative to a court order
of hospitalization; and
(e) The hospital or mental health facility in which the individual is to
be hospitalized pursuant to this act can provide the individual with treatment that is adequate and appropriate to the individual's conditions and
needs. In the absence of the required findings of the court after the hearing, the court shall forthwith dismiss the proceedings.
(11) (a) The order of hospitalization shall designate the period for which
the individual shall be treated. When the individual is not under an order
of hospitalization at the time of the hearing, this period shall not exceed
six months without benefit of a review hearing. Upon such a review
hearing, to be commenced prior to the expiration of the previous order, an
order for hospitalization may be for an indeterminate period, if the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the required conditions in
Section [Subsection] 64-7-36(10) will last for an indeterminate period.
(b) The court shall maintain a current list of all patients under its
order of hospitalization, which list shall be reviewed to determine those
patients who have been under an order of hospitalization for the desig57
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nated period. At least two weeks prior to the expiration of the designated
period of any order of hospitalization still in effect, the court that entered
the original order shall so inform the clinical director of the mental
health facility responsible for the care of such patient. The director shall
immediately reexamine the reasons upon which the order of hospitalization was based. If the director and staff determine that the conditions
justifying such hospitalization no longer exist, the director shall discharge the patient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate
report thereof to the court and to the Division of Mental Health. Otherwise, the court shall immediately appoint two designated examiners and
proceed under Subsections (8) through (10) of this section.
(c) The clinical director of a mental health facility or a designee responsible for the care of a patient under an order of hospitalization for an
indeterminate period shall at six-month intervals reexamine the reasons
upon which the order of indeterminate hospitalization was based. If the
clinical director or the designee determine that the conditions justifying
such hospitalization no longer exist, the director shall discharge the patient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate report thereof
to the court and the Division of Mental Health. If the clinical director or
designee has determined that the conditions justifying such hospitalization continue to exist, the director shall send a written report of such
findings to the court and to the Division of Mental Health. The patient
and the patient's counsel of record shall be notified in writing that the
involuntary treatment will be continued, the reasons for such, and that
the patient has the right to a review hearing by making a request to the
court. Upon receiving the request, the court shall immediately appoint
two designated examiners and proceed under Subsections (8) through (10)
of this section.
(12) In the event that the designated examiners are unable, because of
refusal of a proposed patient to submit to an examination, to complete such
examination upon the first attempt to conduct the same, the court shall fix a
reasonable compensation to be paid to such designated examiners for services
in the cause.
(13) Any person hospitalized under this act or a person's legally designated
representative who is aggrieved by the findings, conclusions and order of the
court, shall have the right to a rehearing upon a petition filed with the court
within thirty days of the entry of the court order. In the event the petition
alleges error or mistake in the findings, the court shall appoint three impartial designated examiners previously unrelated to the case who shall conduct
an additional examination of the patient. The rehearing shall in all other
respects be conducted in the manner otherwise permitted.
(14) Costs of all proceedings under this section shall be paid by the county
in which the proposed patient resides or is found.
History: C. 1943, 86-7-62, enacted by L.
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963,
ch. 60, § 1; 1967, ch. 174, § 131; 1971, ch.
172, § 10; 1975, ch. 198, § 22; 1979, ch. 97,
§ 17; 1981, ch. 261, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-

ment substituted "issuing a judicial order" in
Subsection (2) for "filing the application"; inserted "or to go to a treatment facility voluntarily" and "or a temporary emergency facility
as provided in section 64-7-38(2)" in the first
sentence of Subsection (3); added the last three
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sentences of Subsection (3); added the last sentence of Subsection (4); deleted ''parent or"
before "legal guardian" in Subsection (5); deleted "of a child or other person" after "legal
guardian" in Subsection (5); deleted "with
whom the proposed patient has been residing"
after "members" in Subsection (5); added
"unless the patient * * * court" to Subsection
(5); substituted "issuance of a judicial order" in
the first sentence of Subsection (8) for "filing of
an application"; substituted "agreed to become
a voluntary patient pursuant to section
64-7-29" in the last paragraph of Subsection (8)
for "become voluntary"; substituted "Prior to
the hearing" in the first sentence of Subsection
(9) for "At the hearing"; added "and allow sufficient time * * * hearing^' to the first sentence of
Subsection (9); inserted the fourth sentence of
the first paragraph of Subsection (9); inserted
"the detention order" in the first sentence of
the last paragraph of Subsection (9); substituted "by clear and convincing evidence" in
Subsection (10) for "beyond a reasonable
doubt"; rewrote Subsection (11) which read:
"The order of hospitalization shall state
whether the individual shall be detained for a
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temporary period not to exceed six months or
an indeterminate period. If hospitalization for
a designated temporary period is ordered, the
patient shall not be retained for a longer period
unless upon a hearing held pursuant to this
section within such designated temporary period. Unless otherwise directed by the court, it
shall be the responsibility of the division of
mental health to assure the carrying out of the
order within such period as the court shall
specify"; substituted "rehearing" in the first
and last sentences of Subsection (13) for "new
hearing"; deleted "in this act" at the end of the
last sentence of Subsection (13); and made
minor changes in punctuation.
Meaning of 'this act". — See note under
same catchline following § 64-7-34.
Cross-References. — Juvenile court, commitment by order of, § 78-3a-39.
Legal capacity of children, Chapter 2 of Title
15.
Limitation of application as to criminally insane, § 64-7-54.
Re-examination of order for hospitalization,
§ 64-7-45.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note: Hospitalization
of the Mentally 111 in Utah: A Practical and
Legal Analysis, 1966 Utah Law Review 223.
The "Mentally 111" and the Law: Sisyphus
and Zeus, James E. Beaver, 1968 Utah L. Rev.
1.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent
Persons §§ 8 to 25, 39 to 42.
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14 to
34.
Key Numbers. — Mental Health *= 37 to
46.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Attorney fees.
—Indigents.
Constitutionality.
Former Subsection (6)(c) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and violated due process of law, since it allowed for the involuntary
commitment of mentally ill individuals who
were not a threat to themselves and/or were
able to make rational decisions as to their own
treatment. Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist.
Court, 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979).
Attorney fees.
—Indigents.
Attorney appointed by court to represent al-

legedly insane person was not entitled to recover fee from county since lawyer was not necessarily required to represent patient at involuntary hospitalization proceeding, notwithstanding attorney's claim that provision requiring appointment of counsel for indigent defendants entitled attorney to recover reasonable value of services from county. Bedford v.
Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12,447 P.2d 193
(1968) (decided prior to 1975 amendment).
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68-3-L Common law adopted.
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict
with, the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws
of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural
and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is
hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2488;
C.L. 1917, § 5838; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-1.
Cross-References. — Common-law crimes
abolished, § 76-1-105.

Married women's property rights, § 30-2-1 et
Seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Construction and application.
Champerty.
Contributory negligence.
Corporate purchase of stock.
Crimes against nature.
Criminal law.
Criminal procedure.
Divorce and dower.
Forcible entry and detainer.
Married women.
Statute of uses.
Water rights.
Writ of elegit.
Compiler's Notes. — The following annotations should be read with caution. The points of
law expressed therein, while true when the
cases were decided, may have been altered or
rendered void by subsequent legislation or judicial opinion.
Construction and application.
This section, by implication at least,
excludes common law from all subjects that are
regulated by statute. Rio Grande, Western Ry.
v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 35 Utah 528, 101 P. 586
(1909).
The common law of England was not adopted
in this territory or state until this section was
enacted. Nor does this section adopt its rigor
and harshness, but only so much as was and
had been generally recognized and enforced in
this country, and as is and was suitable to our
conditions. Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148
P. 1096 (1915).
We adopted the common law of England only
where it is suitable to our conditions, morals,
history and background. Generally, we look to

the system of common law and equity which
prevails in and has been and is now being developed by the decisions of this country and we
reject the common law of England which is not
suitable or adapted to our needs, morals or
ideals. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342
P.2d 94 (1959).
Champerty.
Common law on subject of champertous contracts held modified by former statute providing that "measure and mode of compensation of
attorneys and counselors at law is left to agreement, express or implied, of parties." Croco v.
Oregon Short Line R.R., 18 Utah 311, 54 P.
985, 44 L.R.A. 285 (1898); Kennedy v. Oregon
Short Line R.R., 18 Utah 325, 54 P. 988 (1898);
Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 P.
999 (1900).
Contributory negligence.
The doctrine of contributory negligence has
attained a status similar to a statutory enactment, and abrogation should be by legislative

365

68-3-1

STATUTES

enactment. Bridges v. Union Pac. R.R., 26
Utah 2d 281, 488 P.2d 738, (1971). See
§ 78-27-37.
Corporate purchase of stock.
Under English common law as adopted by
Utah, a corporation could not purchase its own
stock in absence of express statutory or charter
authority. Shumaker v. Utex Exploration Co.,
157 F. Supp. 68 (D. Utah 1957).
Crimes against nature.
Because of this section it was held that the
definition of the "infamous crime against nature" with man or beast had to be sought in the
common law in so far as not defined by criminal statute. State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18,137
P. 632 (1913).
Criminal law.
Criminal statute covering phase of common
law would not be construed as merely restating
common law where wording indicated intent to
broaden or change common law. Oleson v.
Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23 (1926).
Criminal procedure.
Common law applies to criminal procedure
unless otherwise provided by statute; and
§ 78-24-8(4), forbidding physician to testify
without consent of his patient, does not apply
to criminal proceedings, common law being applicable. State v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 254 P.
142 (1927).
Divorce and dower.
Under this section, common-law rule that a
divorce a vinculo bars dower has been adopted.
Whitmore v. Hardin, 3 Utah 121, 1 P. 465
(1881).
Common law respecting dower remained in
force during all time Utah remained a territory, and continued in force after it became a
state, except as modified by statutory enactment. Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360, 88 P.
20 (1906).
Forcible entry and detainer.
The English statute (5 Richard, II) "was a
part of the common law as adopted by the
American jurisdictions." Buchanan v. Crites,
106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R. 167
(1944).

Married women.
The English common law, with its rigorous
limitations imposed upon married women, was
not adopted in the territory of Utah, but only
so much thereof as was applicable to the conditions of the new territory. Hatch v. Hatch, 46
Utah 116, 148 P. 1096 (1915).
The common-law right of the husband to sue
another person for criminal conversation with
his wife which was based on the theory of a
trespass against the wife which had to be
brought by the husband because he and the
wife were one, is contrary to law on that subject as developed in this country on the concept
of the rights of married women and such a
right did not become part of the law of Utah by
virtue of this section. However, the law of this
state does authorize an action to recover damages for criminal conversation based on the exclusive right of either spouse to intercourse
with the other. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d
224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959), distinguished, Black v.
United States, 263 F. Supp. 470 (D. Utah
1967).
Notwithstanding this section, prior will of
woman was not revoked by her subsequent
marriage, contrary to rule at common law. Estate of Armstrong v. Logan, 21 Utah 2d 86,440
P.2d 881 (1968).
Statute of uses.
Although statute of uses never became part
of English common law and has not been
adopted by Utah Legislature, rule of law,
which executes passive or naked trust and
vests legal title in person having use, is part of
Utah common law. Henderson v. Adams, 15
Utah 30, 48 P. 398 (1897).
Water rights.
The Legislature, by this section, did not intend to adopt the common-law doctrine as to
riparian owners, thereby divesting itself of title to bed of navigable waters. State v. Rolio,
71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987 (1927).
Writ of elegit.
Writ of elegit did not exist in territory of
Utah. Thompson v. Avery, 11 Utah 214, 39 P.
829 (1895).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Common
Law §§ 13 to 18.
C.J.S. — 15A CJ.S. Common Law §§ 11,13
to 15.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Sundays and
Holiday § 70 et seq.
C.J.S. — 40 CJ.S. Holidays §§ 4 to 6.
A.L.R. — Service of summons or complaint

on Sunday or holiday, validity of, 63 A.L.R.3d
423.
Key Numbers. — Holidays *=> 4 to 6.

68-3-9. Seal, how affixed.
When the seal of a court or public officer is required by law to be affixed to
any paper, the word "seal" includes an impression of such seal upon the paper
alone, as well as upon wax or a wafer affixed thereto. In all other cases the
word "seal" may include a scroll printed or written.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2495;
C.L. 1917, § 6845; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-9.
Cross-References. — Custody of seals by
archivist, § 63-2 to 62.5.

Great seal of the State of Utah, Utah Const.,
Art. VII, Sec. 20; § 67-la-8.
Municipal seals, § 10-1-202.
Seals of courts, §§ 78-7-14, 78-7-15.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 68 Am. Jur. 2d Seals § 3.
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Seals § 3.
Key Numbers. — Seals «= 3.

68-3-10. Joint authority is authority to majority.
Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers, or other
persons, are to be construed as giving such authority to a majority of them,
unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving the authority.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2496;
C.L. 1917, § 5846; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-10.

Cross-References. — Personal representatives, majority concurrence required unless
will provides otherwise, § 75-3-716.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Board of education.
Joint authority is not "otherwise expressed"
in any statute prescribing the powers and du-

ties of a board of education. Tooele Bldg. Ass'n
v. Tooele High School Dist. No. 1,43 Utah 362,
134 P. 894 (1913).

68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and phrases.
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the
approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are
defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2497;
C.L. 1917, § 5847; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-11.

Cross-References. — Duty of court to construo statutes, § 78-21-3.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Construction and application.
Court's duty.
Meaning of word "maintain."
Meaning of word "may."
Supplying omissions.
Title of act.
Words used repeatedly in statute.
Construction and application.
Where there is doubt respecting true meaning of certain words, then words should be read
in light of conditions and necessities which
they are intended to meet and objects sought to
be attained thereby. United States Smelting,
Refining & Milling Co. v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 58 Utah 168, 197 P. 902 (1921).
Presumption is that words are used in their
ordinary sense and if a different interpretation
is sought it must rest upon something in the
character of the legislation or in the context
which will justify a different meaning. Deseret
Sav. Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 P. 1114
(1923).
Unless technical terms are used, words employed in statute must be given their usual and
ordinary meaning. Cache Auto Co. v. Central
Garage, 63 Utah 10,221 P. 862,30 A.L.R. 1217
(1923).
Meaning of words found in statute must be
determined from general context of the same
and the intent or object sought to be accomplished by the legislation, and courts in attempting to arrive at the intent of the Legislature will disregard mere forms and look to the
substance. State v. Franklin, 63 Utah 442, 226
P. 674 (1924).
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the approved usage
of the language; except in case of technical
words and phrases, they must be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning,
but technical rules of construction may be disregarded where it is manifest, when the subject
of legislation, considered from all points of
view, is such as to convince the understanding
that the Legislature could not have intended a
literal interpretation. State v. Hendrickson, 67
Utah 15, 245 P. 375, 57 A.L.R. 786 (1926).
This section is merely declaratory of pre-existing rules of statutory construction. State v.
Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933).
Definition of word may depend upon the
character of its use in a statute. State v.
Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933).
Unless contrary appears, terms of legislative
enactment must be taken in their ordinary and
usual significance as they are generally under-

stood. Emmertson v. State Tax Comm'n, 93
Utah 219, 72 P.2d 467,113 A.L.R. 1174 (1937).
Court's duty.
It is duty of courts to enforce plain intent of
statute, but courts ought not to construe an act
to effect the forfeiture of property of one citizen
to another, unless "plain and unequivocal
mandate of the Legislature admits of no other
rational construction." Rospigliosi v. Glenallen
Mining Co., 69 Utah 41,252 P. 276 (1926) (construing usury statute).
In construction of statutes it is duty of courts
to ascertain intent of legislative body, and in
determining this intent, not only should language of act be considered, but also purposes
and objects sought by Legislature, and if legislation is within constitutional power, to enforce such intent. Price v. Tuttle, 70 Utah 156,
258 P. 1016 (1927).
It is court's duty, when possible, to give to
every word, phrase, clause, and sentence of
statute a consistent, reasonable meaning. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9
(1927).
Meaning of word "maintain."
In applying this section to the construction of
word "maintain," the court said that that
which is contained in statute by implication is
as much part of statute as that which expressly
appears therein. Merrill v. Spencer, 14 Utah
273, 46 P. 1096 (1896).
Meaning of word "may."
Word "may" as used in § 78-56-10, providing
that judge of city court "may" employ shorthand reporter upon request of any party,
should be construed as discretionary, not mandatory. Purcell v. Wilkins, 57 Utah 467,195 P.
547 (1921).
Supplying omissions.
In construing statutes court may supply
manifest omissions in order to avoid absurd
and mischievous consequences and to effect
legislative intent. Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 69 Utah 521, 256 P. 790
(1927).
Court may inquire into purpose sought to be
accomplished in order to supply missing words
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of statute, and words which are obviously necessary to complete sense will be supplied to
effect a meaning clearly shown by other parts
of statute. Chez ex rel. Weber College v. Utah
State Bldg. Comm'n, 93 Utah 538, 74 P.2d 687
(1937).
Title of act.
While it is true that the title is not integrated into the operating portion of legislation,
and that it will not be permitted to contradict
or defeat a plainly expressed intent, and that
such title cannot be used to create an ambiguity or uncertainty when the language in the
body of the act is clear, nevertheless, where
clarity is lacking in the language of an enactment, the title may be considered to shed light
upon and clarify the meaning. Great Salt Lake
Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45,

68-3-12

Words used repeatedly in statute.
Word repeatedly used in statute will be presumed to bear same meaning throughout statute, unless there is something to show that another meaning was intended. Merrill v. Spencer, 14 Utah 273, 46 P. 1096 (1896); State v.
Tingey, 24 Utah 225, 67 P. 33 (1902).
The same words, especially if found in different statutes, may not always have the same
effect, and it follows that in order to determine
intention and purpose of lawmaker, and to harmonize conflicting provisions where such occur, it at times becomes necessary for courts to
expand or to restrict ordinary and usual meaning of words, phrases, or clauses found in particular section or statute. Board of Educ. of
Carbon County School Dist. v. Bryner, 57 Utah
78, 192 P. 627 (1920).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes
§§ 204, 225 to 227, 238, 250.
C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 314, 315,329,
330, 348.

Key Numbers. — Statutes «=» 178,179,188,
192, 208.

68-3-12. General rules.
In the construction of these statutes the following rules shall be observed,
unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
Legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute:
(1) "Month" means a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed, and
the word "year," or the abbreviation "A.D." is equivalent to the expression "year of our Lord."
(2) "Oath" includes "affirmation," and the word "swear" includes "affirm." Every oral statement under oath or affirmation is embraced in the
term "testify," and every written one, in the term "depose."
(3) "Signature" includes any name, mark, or sign written with the
intent to authenticate any instrument or writing.
(4) "Writing" includes printing, handwriting, and typewriting.
(5) "Person" includes individuals, bodies politic and corporate, partnerships, associations, and companies.
(6) The singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singular.
(7) Words used in one gender comprehend the other.
(8) Words used in the present tense include the future.
(9) "Property" includes both real and personal property.
(10) "Land," "real estate," and "real property" include land, tenements,
hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights, and claims.
(11) "Personal property" includes every description of money, goods,
chattels, effects, evidences of rights in action, and all written instruments
by which any pecuniary obligation, right or title to property is created,
acknowledged, transferred, increased, defeated, discharged, or diminished, and every right or interest therein.
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THERAPISTS DUTY TO WARN

78-14a-102

CHAPTER 14a
LIMITATION OF THERAPIST'S DUTY
TO WARN
Section
78-14a-101.
78- 14a-102.

Definitions.
Limitation of therapist's duty to
warn.

78-14a-101. Definitions.
As used in this chapter, "therapist" means:
(1) a psychiatrist licensed to practice medicine under Sections 58-12-26
through 58-12-43, the Utah Medical Practice Act;
(2) a psychologist licensed to practice psychology under Chapter 25a,
Title 58;
(3) a marriage and family therapist licensed to practice marriage and
family therapy under Chapter 39, Title 58;
(4) a social worker licensed to practice social work under Chapter 35,
Title 58; and
(5) a psychiatric and mental health nurse specialist licensed to practice
advanced psychiatric nursing under Chapter 31, Title 58.
History: C. 1953, 78-14a-101, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 89, § 1; 1989, ch. 42, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective July 1, 1989, substituted "Sections 58-12-26 through 58-12-43" for "Chapter

12, Title 58" in Subsection (1) and "Chapter
25a" for "Chapter 25" in Subsection (2).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 89 became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-14a-102. Limitation of therapist's duty to warn.
(1) A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection from any violent behavior of his client or patient, except when that client
or patient communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical violence
against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall
be discharged if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to communicate the
threat to the victim, and notifies a law enforcement officer or agency of the
threat.
(2) No cause of action arises against a therapist for breach of trust or privilege, or for disclosure of confidential information, based on a therapist's communication of information to a third party in an effort to discharge his duty in
accordance with Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not limit or effect a therapist's duty to report child
abuse or neglect in accordance with Section 62A-4-503.
History: C. 1953, 78-14a-102, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 89, § 2.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 89 be-

came effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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